Attackers send X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 to gain admin on GPUStack
SANS Internet Storm Center has observed exploit attempts against CVE-2026-102895, an authentication bypass in GPUStack, open-source software that manages clusters of GPUs for AI workloads. Johannes Ullrich described the attacks in a diary entry on 12 November. The requests are short: a plain GET / carrying the header X-Gpustack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1. The source address he saw had also been probing for other AI endpoints such as /v1/models and /v1/messages.
The GitHub security advisory for the flaw, GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr, rated critical, explains the cause. In GPUStack before version 2.2.0, the function that resolves the current user promotes any request considered to come from loopback to the built-in administrator account when the setting force_auth_localhost is false, which is the default. Whether a request counts as loopback is decided by the client-IP logic, and the advisory gives two ways to make it say 127.0.0.1 without credentials.
The first needs no attacker trick at all. In the common self-hosted setup, GPUStack sits behind a reverse proxy on the same host that forwards to 127.0.0.1, so every remote request arrives with a loopback TCP peer and the auto-admin branch fires. The second is the forged header that SANS is seeing in the wild.
Either way, the advisory says, the result is full unauthenticated administrative access: listing and changing users, models, workers and configuration, minting persistent admin API keys valid from any address, and reading worker credentials and cloud provider secrets. Combined with admin-only features such as creating inference backends from YAML, it leads to code execution on worker hosts. The advisory states that the flaw has been exploited against a v2.1.1 deployment, with attacker-created backends running reverse shells.
The timeline is long. Version 2.2.0, which removes the loopback auto-admin path and hardens forwarding-header handling, was released at the end of June; according to SANS the issue became public at the end of July and the CVE was assigned on 4 November. Workarounds for those who cannot upgrade are to set force_auth_localhost=true, to strip client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP headers at the edge and to keep the API off untrusted networks.

Why it matters
Ullrich calls the pattern common: proxies add headers to say where a request came from, and the application trusts them for security decisions. The advisory adds the less obvious half, that a same-host proxy makes every request look local even without a forged header. Any service that treats localhost as trusted should be checked for both.