SANS ISC honeypots see a scanner hunting SAP NetWeaver webshells left via CVE-2025-31324
Johannes Ullrich of the SANS Internet Storm Center reported on 9 November a request path he had not seen before in the centre's honeypot data: /irj/servlet_jsp/irj/root/ant.jsp. He links it to a wider campaign that either exploits SAP NetWeaver or looks for webshells that earlier attacks left behind.
The underlying flaw is CVE-2025-31324, which carries the maximum CVSS score of 10 and lets an attacker upload files without authentication. Ullrich notes that attackers have used it to drop webshells, which typically end up in the /irj/servlet_jsp/irj/root/ directory, so a request for a file there is a check for whether a shell is already present.
The diary lists the paths requested by one source address, 82.26.72.21. Ullrich stresses that not all of them concern SAP. Besides the NetWeaver path and a /developmentserver/metadatauploader endpoint, the list includes /_layouts/15/ pages, several index.php?option=com_… upload tasks, /MagicInfo/, /NmConsole/ and /commandcenter/ paths and generic /api/upload routes, with the same file names ant.jsp, ant.php and ant.aspx tried in different places. Ullrich also points out a misspelt upload.apsx next to the correct upload.aspx.

What to check
SAP NetWeaver systems that were exposed before CVE-2025-31324 was patched should be searched for unexpected files in the irj root directory, not just patched, since a scanner like this one is looking for shells that survived the patch. Web server logs showing requests for ant.jsp or similar names in odd locations are a sign of the same tooling. The broader lesson of the list is that one scanner tries many vendors' upload endpoints at once, so a hit on any of them says little about which product the attacker expects to find.